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and (ii) the slope of the short-run Phillips curve.
They analyze optimal policy under three assumed
behaviors of the policymakers: (i) no learning; (ii)
Baysian optimal policy, under which the policy-
maker engages in some policy experimentation
to obtain information on the probability distribu-
tion of the model parameters; and (iii) adaptive
optimal policy, under which it is assumed that the
policymaker updates information on the proba-
bility distributions of the parameters each period
but will not learn in the future from observations.
They conclude, for the examples they consider,
that there can be substantial benefits (lower values
of the policymakers’ loss function) from adaptive
optimal policy compared with the “no learning”
assumption, but that the benefits from experimen-
tation (Baysian optimal policy) are modest.
ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS AND
RULES OF THUMB FOR
MONETARY POLICY
The second paper presented at the conference,
by Athanasios Orphanides and Volker Wieland,
investigates whether situations where policy
actions appear to deviate from simple outcomes-
based rules of thumb such as the Taylor rule,
depend on policymakers’ forecasts of key vari-
ables. They examine this question drawing on 20
years of published FOMC projections of inflation,
real growth, and unemployment in the semiannual
monetary policy reports to Congress. From the
T
he Thirty-Second Annual Policy
Conference of the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis brought together
economists working on the conduct of
monetary policy under uncertainty. This subject,
which has been a long-standing professional
interest of President William Poole’s, is of signifi-
cant academic and theoretical interest, but also
defines the environment that confronts central
bankers around the world at each policy meeting.
In the course of these conference presentations
and discussions, frequent reference was made to
“Rules-of-Thumb for Guiding Monetary Policy,”
which President Poole published in 1971 in Open
Market Policies and Operating Procedures—
Staff Studies. Because this volume is not readily
available, we have reprinted the Poole contribu-





In the first paper presented at the conference,
Lars Svensson and Noah Williams consider policy-
makers who face uncertainty about the slope
coefficients of their model of the economy. The
economy is modeled as a New Keynesian dynamic
structure with endogenous forward expectations.
They consider two sources of uncertainty: (i) the
degree of forward-looking behavior in inflation
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quarter-ahead forecasts of inflation and unemploy-
ment. They regress the intended funds rate on the
day after the February and July FOMC meetings
on a constant and the forecasts of the inflation
and unemployment rates. In this specification,
the constant term captures the equilibrium real
interest rate, the inflation target, and the natural
rate of unemployment—all of which are presumed
to be roughly constant over the sample period. In
parallel regressions they use the real-time infor-
mation for the last four quarters available at the
time of the February and July FOMC meetings to
evaluate an outcomes-based rule of thumb for
policy. Alternatives to both specifications include
the intended funds rate adopted at the FOMC
meeting prior the February or July meeting as an
additional regressor to incorporate policy inertia.
In both specifications, the lagged funds rate enters
significantly, though the marginal contribution
is smaller in the forecast-based specification.
One issue is that the FOMC has changed the
preferred measure of inflation twice during the
sample period. However, estimated coefficients
from regressions on a shortened sample period
ending with 1999, a period during which the
FOMC was focused in CPI inflation, are little
changed from those of the full sample period. The
authors conclude that the forecast-based estimates
better characterize historical FOMC decision-
making than do the corresponding outcomes-
based estimates.
HOUSE PRICES AND THE
STANCE OF MONETARY POLICY
In the third paper presented at the conference,
Marek Jarocin ´ski and Frank Smets investigate the
role of housing markets and monetary policy in
U.S. business cycles since the second half of the
1980s using an identified Baysian vector auto-
regressive (VAR) model. Their models include
nine variables: real GDP, real consumption, the
GDP deflator, residential investment as a share
of GDP, real house prices, commodity prices, the
federal funds rate, the long-term interest rate
spread, and the money stock. The model is esti-
mated in two ways: as a VAR in levels and as a
differences VAR.
Analysis of the differences model suggests
that some of the housing boom in 2002-03 can be
attributed to real and nominal GDP developments,
but that these forces do not account for the accel-
eration in the growth of house prices in 2004-05.
However, the model suggests that the unusually
low levels of short- and long-term interest rates
were important factors in the boom in housing
markets in the United States in 2004-05. The
authors also conclude that housing demand shocks
have significant effects on housing investment
and house prices, but that these shocks have lim-
ited impact on the aggregate economy. However,
it appears that these conclusions are not particu-
larly robust in the levels model specification.
In a second part of their paper, the authors
address monetary conditions index (MCI) method-
ology. They construct MCIs, using the two speci-
fications of the Baysian VAR. Their MCIs are
weighted averages of current and lagged levels of
the short-term interest rate, the term spread, and
real house price growth. The MCIs are based on
both expected output growth and expected infla-
tion. Analysis shows that uncertainty about the
MCIs is very high—it is not possible to reject the
hypothesis that the monetary conditions were
neutral during the entire sample period. Never-
theless, the authors conclude that taking house
prices into account seems to matter for measuring
the stance of monetary policy, and that, based on
the results from their measured indices, monetary
policy was relatively loose in 2004-05 and tight
in 2007.
ASSESSING MONETARY POLICY
EFFECTS USING DAILY FEDERAL
FUNDS FUTURES CONTRACTS
In the fourth paper presented at the confer-
ence, James Hamilton tries to measure the magni-
tude of the effect of changes in the target that the
FOMC sets for the overnight federal funds rate
(the intended funds rate) on other interest rates,
including those for Treasury securities with long
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previous analyses by assuming that there exists
some day within a month when the intended
funds rate may have changed, but does not con-
dition on this date in constructing econometric
estimates.
In the first stage of the analysis, Hamilton
examines the relation between the effective funds
rate and the intended funds rate. He develops a
statistical description of how deviations between
these two rates, together with a learning process
by market participants, determine the volatility
of spot-month (i.e., current month) futures rates.
He constructs the variance of changes in the spot-
month futures rate as the sum of two terms: one
that represents the contribution of deviations of
the effective funds rate from the intended rate
and a second that represents the contribution of
changes in the intended funds rate. He shows that
these two terms imply that the variance of changes
in the spot-month futures rate should decline
over most of the month, but increase toward the
end of the month. He finds that this model gen-
erally captures the intramonth volatility in the
spot-month futures rate.
The second stage of the analysis addresses
the question of what an observed movement in
the spot-month futures rate signals about market
expectations of the intended funds rate that will
be set for the month. He concludes that this rela-
tionship can be derived from the properties of the
deviations of the effective funds rate from the
intended funds rate and from the squared changes
in the spot-month futures rate. As the month
progresses, the signal from changes in the spot-
month futures rate about changes in the intended
rate strengthens until after the middle of the
month, from which point it decreases sharply to
zero at the end of the month.
From the above analysis he concludes that
the impact of changes in the spot-month futures
rate should rise through the first half of the month
and then fall off quickly to zero in the second
half of the month. This predicted pattern is sup-
ported in the intramonth evidence of changes in
Treasury yields in maturity ranges of one to ten
years.
ANNOUNCEMENTS AND THE
ROLE OF POLICY GUIDANCE
In the final paper presented at the conference,
Carl Walsh investigates the role of transparency
about the central bank’s assessment of future
economic conditions on the effectiveness of mone-
tary policy. His framework is a New Keynesian
model with Calvo-type price adjustment by
monopolistic competitive firms. He assumes that
central bank preferences are known. He assumes
two alternative policy regimes. In the first regime,
the central bank makes no announcements, so
private agents observe only the current setting of
the monetary policy instrument. In the second
regime, the central bank releases its projections
of future economic conditions. The central bank
does not have perfect foresight, so the announced
projections are subject to forecast errors. Private
agents also possess noisy information about the
future of the economy, and there is heterogeneity
in the forecasts of the individual agents. The
object of the analysis is to determine how private
agents learn from the information provided by
the central bank.
Several conclusions emerge from the analysis.
First, higher-quality central bank information
improves welfare, in that the central bank can
implement more-effective stabilization policy.
However, more information about the central
bank’s imperfect outlook for the future does not
necessarily improve welfare. The increased trans-
parency of the central bank lowers relative price
dispersion across firms, because the set of infor-
mation common to all firms is increased. But
such increased common information can make
private expectations more volatile, especially in
those situations where firms have relatively poor
information about the future.
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